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Abstract:   
This  paper  reports  research  seeking  to  understand  the  economic  implications  for 
central  Queensland  graziers  of  participating  in  a  carbon  trading  scheme  and  to 
measure the likely participation of  graziers  in  an emissions  trading scheme under 
various market design scenarios.   
An initial desktop study was undertaken to compare an enterprise which produced 
only cattle to one which produced cattle and sequestered carbon. The findings from 
this  analysis  were  used  to  inform  the  design  of  an  experimental  auction  to  test 
alternative carbon trading scenarios.   
An  experimental  workshop  was  conducted  at  seven  locations  across  central 
Queensland  with  a  range  of  beef  producers,  extension  officers  and  consultants.  
Participants  were  presented  with  a  scenario  in  which  they  had  the  choice  of 
maintaining current management practices against altering management practices to 
reduce beef production and enter into a carbon sequestration contract (CSC).  They 
were  asked  at  what  price  they  would  enter  into  a  CSC  and  how  that  price  and 
likelihood  of  participating  would  change  under  a  range  of  alternative  contract 
conditions. 
The results of the experimental auctions found significantly higher than breakeven 
prices for carbon would be required before landholders would offer land as a carbon 
offset.  Participation rates were influenced by price and also the carbon contract rules.  
Five rule changes were trialled and all were found to have a significant impact on 





In  September  2008  the  Australian  Government  announced  plans  to  introduce  an 
emissions trading scheme to be known as the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(CPRS) (Department of Climate Change 2008a).  The stated aim of the proposed 
scheme is to reduce carbon emissions and will initially cover the stationary energy,   - 3 - 
transport, fugitive emissions, industrial processes, waste, and forestry sectors.  Initial 
policy papers proposed that agriculture will initially be exempt from the scheme and a 
final  decision  on  inclusion  will  be  made  in  2013  for  implementation  in  2015 
(Australian Government 2008).  This position was revised and the policy at time of 
publication  is  that  agriculture  will  be  permanently  excluded  from  the  CPRS.  
However, the Australian Government has also indicated that agriculture will need to 
demonstrate  reductions  in  emissions  to  meet  world  best  practice  standards 
(Department of Climate Change 2009). 
The Fitzroy Basin in Central Queensland is the second largest externally draining 
catchment in Australia (after the Murray-Darling), and is representative of a number 
of regions in Australia with a range of resource intensive industries. Almost eighty per 
cent of the Fitzroy Basin is currently grazing land and as such the region has the 
potential to be both negatively impacted by any emissions trading scheme but also to 
contribute  to  emissions  reduction  through  vegetation  sequestration.    This  paper 
examines the economic tradeoffs for graziers of trading carbon offsets from regrowth 
vegetation in a voluntary carbon trading scheme and estimates likely participation 
under a range of market design and reporting frameworks. 
Carbon Emissions Accounting and Trading  
The proposed Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme will begin operation in 
2011 and cover most major greenhouse gas emitting sectors; however at this stage 
agriculture is excluded.  The Australian Government has indicated that a system for 
sequestration  credits  will  be  developed  to  allow  offsets  from  agricultural  sources 
including direct emissions from livestock, manure management, fertiliser use, savanna 
burning and avoided deforestation (Department of Climate Change 2009).   
In addition to these requirements agriculture is likely to experience increases in the 
costs of inputs including fuel, electricity and fertilizer as major emitters pass on the 
costs of abatement (Keogh 2007). 
Several  emissions  trading  schemes  are  already  operating  internationally.    These 
include  the  European  Emissions  Trading  Scheme  which  covers  the  energy  and 
industrial  sectors  in  27  countries  across  the  European  Union.    The  New  Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme began in 2008 with the forestry sector.  New Zealand is   - 4 - 
the only national emissions trading scheme other than Australia which is proposing to 
include  agricultural  emissions  in  a  mandatory  reporting  program  (New  Zealand 
Government 2009).  Japan has a Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme which also 
began in 2005 to trial emissions trading, initially between 31 businesses.   
The voluntary carbon emissions market in Australia consists of a range of  programs 
such  as  ‘Greenhouse  Friendly’  which  provide  accreditation  to  companies  which 
follow  certain  practices  to  reduce  their  carbon  emissions  (Department  of  Climate 
Change 2008b) and several companies which are offering landholders payments in 
return for changed land management practices such as reducing land clearing.   
Impact of greenhouse gas emissions policy on Agriculture  
Since the release of the CPRS Green and White papers a profusion of modelling has 
appeared from various sources on the potential impact of an emissions trading scheme 
on agriculture.  Modelling from the Commonwealth Treasury found that the impact on 
economic growth would be minimal (real GNP per capital growth of 1.1 per cent 
compared  to  1.2  per  cent  without  CPRS)  and  that  agriculture  would  maintain  its 
comparative advantage in global markets (Treasury 2008).  In comparison, modelling 
which considered specifically the impacts on agriculture at the sector and farm level, 
found significant decreases in profit and production under almost all CPRS scenarios 
across most industries (CIE 2009; Ford et al. 2009; Keogh 2009; Tulloh 2009).             
The results  published by  ABARE  (Ford  et  al.  2009;  Tulloh 2009) were the most 
positive for agriculture, predicting a three per cent increase in grain profitability and a 
minimal 1.6 per cent fall in livestock productivity by 2020 (assuming that agriculture 
becomes a covered sector from 2015).  Importantly, ABARE assumed that similar 
policies including agriculture would be implemented in major international markets 
within a similar timeframe.  However,  currently  the only  other major  agricultural 
producer considering the inclusion of agriculture in an emissions trading scheme is 
New  Zealand.    Therefore  significant  impacts  on  export  market  competiveness  are 
likely.   
The modelling conducted by ABARE does recognise the fact that the agricultural 
processing sector will be covered from 2011.  This sector is highly trade exposed and 
therefore unlikely to be able to pass on the full rate of cost increases to the consumer.    - 5 - 
Thus, along with increased prices for inputs including fuel, electricity and fertilizer, 
agricultural  producers  will  potentially  face  lower  prices  for  their  outputs  (Tulloh 
2009).  Early modelling conducted by the Australian Farm Institute (AFI) based on 
representative farm financial models found that the beef and sheep industries would 
experience  large  declines  in  returns  as  measured  by  the  difference  in  farm  cash 
margins (-6% to -20%).  Further modelling conducted by the Centre for International 
Economics (CIE) for the AFI predicted a 9 per cent fall in gross value of production 
(GVP) for beef by 2020 and a fall of almost 30 per cent by 2030 (CIE  2009).  GVP 
was also predicted to fall across other major sectors of the agricultural industry with 
the worst affected being wool (-27.48% by 2030) and sheepmeat (-21.02% by 2030).  
This modelling was based on an assumption of 100% free allocation of permits in 
2015, reducing to zero over a period of ten years. 
As noted by AFI in a second report released in September 2009 the results produced 
by all models are dependent on the assumptions of policy design and carbon price 
made  by  each  institution  (Keogh  2009).    While  each  has  striven  to  make  these 
assumptions based on current government policy and price expectations, significant 
uncertainty exists to reduce confidence in any estimate at this stage.  As a result 
ongoing  research  is  required  to  ensure  accurate  measurement  and  monitoring 
protocols are in place prior to the commencement of any emissions reduction scheme. 
Various attempts have been made to estimate the potential supply of carbon credits 
from agriculture (for example Antle et al. 2007; Lawson et al. 2008).  Antle (2007) 
used county level data agricultural census data from the United States to construct 
profit functions which were then used to derive soil carbon supply curves based on 
marginal opportunity costs of carbon sequestration versus current cropping practices.  
This method found that to accurately model carbon sequestration would require a 
comprehensive  model  of  land  use  choices  with  capacity  to  account  for  spatial 
variation in opportunity costs.   
Lawson et al (2008) estimated that at a carbon price of $29.10 CO2
-e approximately 25 
million  hectares  of  land  in  Australia  would  become  economically  suitable  for 
afforestration, 40 per cent of which would be in Queensland.  Lawson et al (2008) 
estimated that this area of land would sequester approximately 623 million tonnes of 
CO2
-e over the period 2007-2050.     - 6 - 
These estimates are largely based on biophysical potential and to a lesser degree on 
economic viability; they do not take into consideration the range of other factors such 
as social dynamics or biodiversity considerations which may also influence land use 
decisions.  A review of biosequestration options for Queensland found that although 
there was biophysical potential for up to 225 million tonnes of CO2
-e to be sequestered 
on rural land annually, the actual potential was likely to be only 10 to 15 per cent of 
this  figure  (CSIRO  2009).    Figures  estimated  in  CSIRO  (2009)  also  differ 
significantly from those calculated by the Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut 
2008).  For example, Garnaut estimated that approximately 286 million tonnes of 
CO2
-e  per  year  would  be  available  from  rangelands.    Estimates  contained  in  the 
CSIRO report are for only 75 million tonnes per year from rangeland sources, a third 
of which would be in Queensland.  Of this it is estimated that only 6.3 million tonnes 
would  actually  be  offered  as  carbon  offsets.    The  magnitude  of  the  differences 
between these estimates highlights again the need for further research to understand 
not only the biophysical potential for carbon offsets but also the economic and social 
potential.   
In addition, many of the options for biosequestration proposed by Garnaut (Garnaut 
2008, Table 22.2, page 543) are not currently available under the conditions of the 
Kyoto agreement as signed by Australia.  The biggest source Garnaut identified was 
the  rehabilitation  of  rangelands  and  mulga  country  degraded  by  overgrazing.  
Australia elected not to sign Article 3.4 of the Kyoto protocol which covers grazing 
management  in  the  2008-2012  reporting  period  (Department  of  Climate  Change 
2008c).  The  reason  for  not  including  Article  3.4  was  concern  over  the  risks  of 
emissions  from  natural  disturbances  such  as  wildfires  and  droughts  having  to  be 
included in the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (Department of Climate Change 
2008c). 
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Designing Policy Solutions 
While  it  appears  that  agriculture  will  be  permanently  exempt  from  a  compulsory 
emissions trading scheme, indications are that some form of emissions management 
will be implemented for the sector.   Difficulties such as achieving acceptable levels 
of  measurement  accuracy,  reporting  and  transactional  costs  make  the  inclusion  of 
agriculture under a similar format to the CPRS problematic.  This is particularly so for 
the extensive grazing sector.   
There are approximately 60,000 beef producing entities in Australia compared to only 
1000 entities required to report under the first stage of the CPRS.  These 1000 entities 
represent those businesses which emit greater than 25 000 tonnes of CO2
-e per year.  
Applying the same assumptions to agriculture would mean that less than one per cent 
of Australian agricultural entities would be required to directly report.  The farms 
covered under this threshold represent only two per cent of agricultural emissions 
(Ford et al. 2009; Tulloh 2009).   
The  framework  used  to  calculate  the  current  National  Greenhouse  Gas  Inventory 
(AGO 2006) calculates methane emissions from tropical pastures based on factors 
developed by Kurihara (1999) and Kurihara et al (2006).  The calculations are based 
on standard estimates of liveweight, liveweight gain and dry matter intake for broad 
classes of cattle.  Whilst this method provides a sufficiently accurate estimate for 
national emissions accounting and Kyoto reporting, it does not take into account the 
large variation in seasonal conditions, grazing management and breed which occur in 
northern Australia.  An emissions trading or carbon offset scheme for agriculture, in 
whatever form it takes, will essentially be a case of creating a market for a product 
which was previously a public good. The use of market based instruments to resolve 
market failures in the area of environmental and natural resource management is a 
relatively new but not untested system.  Previous experience both within Australia and 
internationally has shown that the specific design details of the scheme will have 
significant impact on how successful the scheme is. 
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Auctions for carbon offsets 
Auction mechanisms
1 have previously proven  successful in procuring the supply of 
environmental services in Australia (Rolfe et al. 2008; Stoneham et al. 2003; Windle 
& Rolfe 2008) and overseas (Cason & Gangadharan 2007).  To be successful auctions 
need  to  have  high  numbers  of  participants  who  have  access  to  good  information 
regarding the value of the goods to be offered.   
Participants in agricultural carbon contracts are likely to be small producers who are 
less than perfectly informed, have difficulty estimating true opportunity costs and face 
resource  constraints  in  increasing  knowledge  and  ability  to  calculate  true  values.  
There are potentially many eligible bidders, however insufficient knowledge of the 
process, long term consequences and distrust of governments are likely to be barriers 
to entry.  The large number of potential bidders supplying relatively small amounts of 
carbon  also  results  in  high  transaction  costs.  To  mitigate  perceived  risks  in  this 
environment landholders are likely to overstate costs and offset values which may 
result in their bids being rejected.  Therefore, the efficiency of the final outcome will 
be dependent on the auction design and how the price discovery process is managed.  
A review of auction literature finds that ascending auctions tend to favour advantaged 
bidders, deter weaker bidders and are often subject to issues of collusion (Klemperer 
2002).  Alternatively, sealed bid auctions are more likely to attract greater numbers of 
bidders  as  ‘weaker’  firms  have  a  greater  chance  of  winning  (Klemperer  2002).  
However, sealed bid auctions  require bidders to have  good information about  the 
distribution of their rivals’ values to bid intelligently (Klemperer 2002).  Given that in 
the market for agricultural carbon offsets bidders may not have good information on 
their own values, there is little chance that they will have good information on rivals’ 
values.    This  may  lead  to  high  levels  of  over-bidding  to  compensate  for  lack  of 
information and to avoid risks of the ‘winner’s curse’ (Rolfe et al. 2009) 
                                                 
1 A process by which private suppliers of a good or service (in this case environmental services) bid for 
incentives to supply environmental services such as improved water quality.  The incentives are 
awarded to the bids which represent the greatest outcome per dollar invested.   - 9 - 
Methodology 
The focus of the research reported in this paper is to explore how landholders in the 
Fitzroy basin in central Queensland might potentially be involved in a carbon offset 
market. Research was conducted to explore the level of economic incentives required 
and the likely participation levels in carbon offset markets under different operating 
rules.  The  key  management  strategy  of  interest  was  for  landholders  to  allow 
vegetation regrowth to occur, with subsequent impacts on beef cattle stocking rates 
and profitability.   
The analysis was conducted on the assumption that agriculture would be involved in 
an emissions trading scheme.  While it appears that this may not happen directly, 
there is still an expectation for agriculture to be involved in emissions reductions in 
some form.   
The economic tradeoffs of cattle production versus carbon sequestration were initially 
calculated using a desk-top benefit cost analysis.  The case study considered an 1100 
hectare property in central Queensland which currently produces cattle for the trade 
market.   The property is  a mix of poplar box, Brigalow, bauhinia  and  silver leaf 
ironbark landtypes and current runs approximately one adult equivalent (AE
2) to 7.3 
hectares.   The estimated returns from the curre nt cattle enterprise were calculated 
using representative, regionally accurate gross margins (Best 2007).  The results of 
this analysis were then compared to a purely carbon enterprise in which all cattle were 
removed and vegetation thickening was allowed to occur.  Carbon income was 
calculated based on a carbon price of $10 per tonne CO 2
-e and the assumption that a 
total of 71 tonnes per hectare of CO2
-e would be sequestered and sold over 30 years.  
The third scenario considered a mixed enterprise in which cattle numbers would be 
reduced by to 40% of original levels thus allowing the sale of some cattle plus the 
trading of carbon credits through sequestration in vegetation.  The three scenarios 
were analysed using a discounted cash flow to compare relative returns over the long 
term.  The key assumptions used for this analysis are listed in Table 1. 
                                                 
2 An Adult Equivalent (AE) refers to a method of comparison between animals of different feed 
requirements with a recognised standard of a single adult animal feed ration. The international standard 
being a single non-pregnant, non lactating animal of 455 kilograms live weight EQUALS 1 AE. 
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This analysis assumed that the only costs to a grazier of participating in a voluntary 
carbon trading scheme were the opportunity costs of foregone cattle production and 
the only benefits would be payments for carbon offsets.    For this analysis there was 
no attempt made to incorporate the affects of on-property emissions, transaction costs 
associated  with  a  carbon  reporting  framework  or  perceived  risk  on  the  part  of 
landholders. 
Table 1 Desk-top study assumptions 
Desktop Study  Assumptions 
Landtype  Poplar box/Brigalow 
Enterprise description  Trade steers for domestic market 
Gross margin   $168.61/AE 
Analysis period  30 years 
Discount factor  8% 
Carbon price 
Carbon sequestration 
$10/tonne CO2-e  
2.4 tonnes per hectare per year for the 
first 7 years, 0.35tonnes per hectare per 
year thereafter. 
 
In the second stage of the research, landholders’ willingness to accept payments for 
carbon offsets was tested using an experimental auction.  The auction used a sealed 
bid format which included a general information session on carbon trading policy, 
risks and opportunities.  The aim of this was to provide all participants with the same 
level of information and improve their chances of providing bids which reflected their 
true costs.  Participants were drawn from Queensland Primary Industries and Fisheries 
(QPIF) extension networks, AgForce contacts and Fitzroy basin Association (FBA) 
sub-regional  group contact lists.  Workshop locations and participant numbers are 
shown in  
Table 2.  A copy of the auction rules and bid cards is included in Appendix A. 
Table 2 Workshop Locations and Participant Numbers 
     
Location   No.  Completed Bids 
Biloela  51 
Rockhampton  18 
Emerald  47   - 11 - 
Springsure  7 
Nebo  3 
   
TOTAL  126 
 
The format of the experimental auction workshop was as follows; participants were 
given an information session on carbon trading policy, risks and opportunities then the 
rules  of  the  ‘mock’  carbon  auction  were  explained.    Participants  were  asked  to 
imagine that the CPRS had been introduced and that offsets from agriculture were 
being  sought.    The  auctions  were  conducted  in  two  stages.    The  first  asked 
participants to consider four scenarios which included a photo standard, details on 
land-type,  pasture,  carrying  capacity  and  condition.    Participants  were  asked  to 
imagine that they owned the paddock as described and to answer questions regarding; 
how  they  would  treat  vegetation  regrowth  in  that  paddock  under  current  grazing 
strategies,  the  payment  they  would  require  to  implement  the  rules  of  the  carbon 
trading scheme and the likelihood that they would participate in the scheme given the 
rules as stated.  Four scenarios were developed based on different land types with 
different levels of grazing productivity.  The four scenarios were: 
 Brigalow High Density (Tree Basal Area: 8m
2/hectare) 
 Brigalow Low Density (Tree Basal Area: 3m
2/hectare) 
 Silver-leaf Ironbark High Density (Tree Basal Area: 5.3m
2/hectare) 
 Silver-leaf Ironbark Low Density (Tree Basal Area: 2.7m
2/hectare) 
 
The bid cards and mock auction rules as given to the participants, including the details 
of each of the above scenarios, are included in Appendix A. 
The second stage of the workshop involved asking producers to describe an area on 
their own property which they would include in a carbon trading scheme.  They were 
asked  to  list  the  land-type,  pasture  and  soil  types,  current  grazing  enterprise  and 
stocking  rate.    They  were  then  asked  to  state  the  payment  they  would  require  to 
include  that  area  in  a  carbon  trading  scheme  and  the  likelihood  that  they  would 
participate.  Participants were then asked to consider a list of alternative trading rules 
and how the changed rules would affect both their required payment level and the   - 12 - 
likelihood that they would participate.   The list of trading rules under the original 
scenario and the alternative rules are shown in Table 3.  Each of the rule changes was 
to be considered independently.  A copy of the worksheet outlining the alternative 
rules is included in Appendix B. 
Table 3 Carbon contract trading rules 
     
Original Rule  Alternative Rule 
1 page annual report  5 page annual report 
Independent audit every 5 years  Annual independent audit 
Annual payments  Payments made every five years at 
completion of audit 
No requirement to account  
for methane emissions 
Can only sell net carbon after methane 
emissions accounted for 
Contract length 20 years  Contract length 50 years 
 
The  experimental  auction  rules  allowed  graziers  to  voluntarily  undertake  grazing 
strategies which would sequester additional carbon in return for a specified payment.  
Under the rules of the auction, areas which were to be used for carbon sequestration 
could no longer be cleared or treated for regrowth control.  Cattle could continue to 
graze those areas but as woodland thickening occurred it was expected that carrying 
capacity would be reduced.  The rules also stated that participants would  need to 
implement a weed, fire and pest management plan and ensure that the land remained 
at or above the current land condition score.  The most important assumption to note 
is that there was no requirement for landholders to account for their on farm emissions 
(including methane and land clearing).  This assumption reflects the current policy for 




Desk-top Study   - 13 - 
Table 4 shows the difference in net present value
3 (NPV) between the current cattle 
enterprise and two carbon sequestration options on a per hectare basis.  In the first 
option all cattle are removed and vegetative thickening for sequestration occurs, while 
in the second only 60 per cent of the cattle are removed  to allow for some cattle 
production  and  vegetation  thickening.    Both  scenarios  return  negative  results 
compared to the cattle only enterprise at $10 per tonne  CO2
-e but positive results at 
$25 per tonne CO2
-e.  
 It is currently proposed that the price of carbon in the first year of the CPRS will be 
set at $10 per tonne CO2
-e after which it will be allowed to move with market forces 
and is expected to reach $25 per tonne fairly quickly.  Based on this analysis the beef 
producer would therefore be better remaining a beef only producer in the first years of 
the  CPRS.    The  initial  desk-top  calculation  on  the  mixed  Brigalow/poplar  box 
landtype showed the breakeven price of carbon to be $19.60 per tonne CO2
-e.  This 
means that at a carbon price of $20 per tonne CO2
-e beef producers would be better off 
switching  to  producing  carbon  rather  than  cattle  (assuming  no  risk,  and  no 
requirement to account for emissions). 
Table 4 Net Present Value Differences per hectare compared to Cattle only 
Carbon Price 
($/tCO2-e)  Discount rate  No Cattle  40% cattle 
       
$25          
  6%   $           82    $           30  
  8%   $           66    $           17  
  10%   $           93    $           39  
$10          
  6%  -$        180   -$        131  
  8%  -$        121   -$          90  
   10%  -$        147  -$        108 
   
 
Experimental Auctions 
In the experimental auction stage, seven workshops were held in central Queensland 
for a total of 126 fully completed bid cards.  Bid card sets which were incomplete 
                                                 
3 Net Present Value is the difference between the costs and benefits of a project discounted to present 
values terms.   - 14 - 
were not included in the data analysis.  Eleven completed bids were also removed 
from the data set because they contained extreme values. A summary of results from 
the mock carbon auctions is shown in Table 5.   
The  average  bid  price  per  hectare  across  the  115  included  bids  was  $163.61 
($56.79/tCO2
-e).  This  means  that  on  average,  landholders  in  central  Queensland 
would be willing to participate in a carbon offsets scheme once the carbon price had 
reached $56 per tonne CO2
-e.  As expected, the bid price per hectare was higher for 
the brigalow land type, reflecting the higher opportunity cost of beef production. 
Table 5 Mock Carbon Auction results 
                 









           
Brigalow  72  $64,545.05  48%  $182.74  $63.43 
           
Ironbark  52  $52,949.42  63%  $144.48  $50.15 
 
For  Brigalow  landtypes  26  per  cent  of  producers  would  enter  the  scheme  at  the 
breakeven carbon price of $20 per tonne.  Despite lower opportunity costs on Ironbark 
landtypes only 15% of landholders would enter the scheme at $20 per tonne in these 
areas.  The average participation rate for Brigalow and Ironbark areas was well below 
100 per cent (48 and 63 per cent respectively).  This indicates that there are still a 
significant  number  of  landholders  who  would  not  participate,  regardless  of  price 
offered.  
The results  were also  analysed using multiple regression  analysis to  examine any 
relationships  between  bid  prices  and  participant  characteristics.  The  regression 
analysis  showed  that  level  of  education  and  brigalow  areas  were  positively  and 
significantly related to bid level. This means that as education levels increase, so do 
bid levels.  It was also found that the larger the area supplied, the higher the bid per 
hectare demanded.   - 15 - 
Participation rate rose with participants’ education level but fell for Brigalow areas 
and areas with a higher stocking rate.  There was no significant relationship between 
bid level and stated participation rate which indicates that some landholders would not 
participate regardless of the level of payment offered.   
The  difference  in  bid  price  received  for  Brigalow  and  Ironbark  landtypes  was 
significant at the 5% level using an independent samples t-test.   This is indicative of 
the difference in cattle production opportunity cost between the two landtypes.  There 
was no significant difference between bid price for high carrying capacity Brigalow 
and low carrying capacity Brigalow which indicates that the difference in opportunity 
costs of production was not considered.  The same result was  found for different 
carrying capacities of Ironbark.   
A multiple regression  model was  constructed  to  examine the demographic factors 
which affect bid prices and participation.  Table 6 shows the results of the multiple 
regression  for  factors  affecting  bid  price.    The  number  of  hectares  offered  (Ha), 
education  level  (Education)  and  Brigalow  landtypes  (Brigcard)  were  found  to  be 
significant explanatory variables for bid price 








t  Sig.  B  Std. Error  Beta 
1  (Constant)  -19606.6  11604.1    -1.7  0.94 
Ha  100.3  20.8  0.4  4.8  0.0 
Education  7568.2  3642.9  0.2  2.1  0.00 
Brigcard  11837  6078.5  0.2  1.9  0.054 
a. Dependent Variable: bid  R
2 = 0.23       
 
As shown in Table 7, number of hectares offered (Ha), Brigalow landtypes (Brigcard) 
and stocking rate (Highstock) were found to be significant explanatory variables for 
participation rate.     - 16 - 
Both models were found to be significant but with low explanatory power.  The R-
squared  values  were  0.23  and  0.197  for  the  bid  price  and  participation  models 
respectively.  








t  Sig.  B  Std. Error  Beta 
 (Constant)  0.402  0.125    3.209  0.002 
Ha  0.000  0.000  0.195  2.020  0.046 
Education  0.071  0.038  0.168  1.891  0.061 
Brigcard  -0.145  0.063  -0.206  -2.322  0.022 
Highstock  -0.197  0.061  -0.282  -3.224  0.002 
bid  -2.595E-7  0.000  -0.027  -0.267  0.790 
a. Dependent Variable: Participation  R
2 = 0.02     
 
The second part of the experimental auction workshops involved exploring the impact 
of alternative carbon conditions on bids and participation rates.  Figure 1 shows the 
percentage increase in the level of payment which would be required under alternative 
contract conditions.  Results indicate that if contracts were for 50 years there would be 
a fifty per cent increase in required payment levels compared to original bids based on 
a 20 year contract.  Increases in administration requirements (5 page report, yearly 
independent audit; compared to 1 page annual report, independent audit every 5 years) 
would  require  a  corresponding  thirty  per  cent  increase  in  yearly  payments.    The 
increase  in  administration  (measurement  and  monitoring)  costs  associated  with 
accounting for methane emissions is reflected in the forty per cent increase in required 
payment levels under this scenario.     - 17 - 




















Figure 1 Percentage bid change under alternative rules 
Under  all  alternative  contract  conditions  tested  the  rates  of  participation  fell 
significantly compared to the original conditions.  Table 8 shows the percentage of 
participants  with  a  less  than  50  per  cent  likelihood  of  participating  under  each 
alternative condition.  It is significant to note that the inclusion of methane emissions 
in accounting had the greatest impact on participation; however increasing contract 
length had the greatest impact on bid levels.   
Table  8  Percentage  of  participants  with  a  less  than  50%  likelihood  of 
participating 
                    















Brigalow  38%  63%  61%  68%  83%  75% 
Ironbark  23%  73%  75%  77%  94%  85% 
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Discussion  
The results of the desktop study of the economics of carbon sequestration on grazing 
lands  indicated  that  even  at  low  carbon  prices,  landholders  would  benefit  from 
introducing a carbon enterprise into their business, assuming that they don’t need to 
account  for  on-farm  emissions.    This  would  involve  some  modest  reductions  in 
stocking rates to allow more vegetation regrowth, and hence carbon accumulation.  
However this does not consider the risks in participating in a carbon offsets scheme 
nor include a penalty for on-farm emissions or emissions from land-clearing.  The 
requirement  to  account  for  on-farm  emissions,  including  those  from  land-clearing 
would change these results significantly. 
These findings were tested in a workshop setting with current producers. When the 
option  of  including  a  carbon  enterprise  into  a  cattle  business  was  tested  with 
producers in central Queensland several trends emerged.  The first is that producers 
generally had a very low level of understanding of most concepts regarding climate 
change and emissions trading schemes.  As a result many participants found it very 
difficult  to  complete  the  bid  sheets.      The  biggest  challenge  to  producers  was  to 
calculate  the  capital  value  implications  of  signing  up  to  long  term  carbon 
sequestration  contracts.    Factors  outside  basic  bid  price  including  education,  land 
type, location and area offered were found to have an impact on participation and bid 
price itself  was  influenced by more than simply  the opportunity  cost  of a carbon 
enterprise.   
Returns from biosequestration on grazing land are highly sensitive to the carbon price.  
Initial desktop studies used a base carbon price of $10 per tonne CO2
-e and conducted 
sensitivity analyses  at  $25  per tonne CO2
-e.  Results  of the experimental  auctions 
showed that less than 20% of producers indicated that they would enter a voluntary 
trading scheme at a carbon price of $10 per tonne CO2
-e.  Of those producers who 
would enter the scheme at this price the average likelihood of participation was less 
than 50 per cent.  These results and the results of testing the sensitivity of producers to 
alternative  conditions  suggest  that  at  low  carbon  prices  very  few  beef  producers 
would be willing to voluntarily change their practices to sequester carbon.  This is 
particularly  true  given  the  high  degree  of  uncertainty  regarding  CPRS  rules  and 
implementation at the time of data collection.   - 19 - 
A limited number of carbon prices have been tested in these scenarios based on the 
price which is set for the first  year of the proposed CPRS and possible prices in 
subsequent years.  However, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the level 
carbon prices may reach and in what time frame.  In addition to uncertainty regarding 
payments  for  carbon  credits,  producers  in  the  experimental  auctions  expressed 
significant concerns regarding the ability of current protocols to accurately measure 
emissions and sequestration, the cost of doing so, liability in the case of fire and the 
impact of participating in the CPRS on the capital value of their property.   
The  supply  (i.e  landholder  participation)  of  carbon  offsets  from  grazing  lands  in 
central  Queensland  is  dependent  on  factors  other  than  simply  the  price  offered.  
Characteristics including the area and type of land considered, current stocking rates, 
education level of the landholder and geographic location impact significantly on the 
level of payment required by landholders and the likelihood that they will participate 
in a voluntary carbon offsets scheme.  Any market design for carbon offsets from 
grazing land should consider these factors.  Also to be considered is the difference 
between average bid price received in experimental auctions and the breakeven cost 
of  providing  carbon  which  demonstrates  the  level  of  risk  premium  graziers  are 
incorporating in their bids as a result of uncertainty regarding carbon scheme rules 
and the likelihood that rules may change in the future.  The magnitude of this risk 
premium is likely to fall if and when emissions trading is introduced in Australia and 
the rules  of the  carbon  emissions  framework  (including verification and reporting 
requirements) applicable to agriculture are understood by industry. 
 
Conclusions  
The economic  analysis  reported here  suggests there is  an opportunity to diversify 
income from grazing businesses depending on the final rules of an emissions trading 
scheme (ETS).  However, participation is likely to remain low in a voluntary system 
until clarity is received on trading rules and contract frameworks.   
At the same time, the results of this study highlight a lack of knowledge amongst 
landholders regarding carbon offsets, the impact of a carbon emission trading scheme 
on  their  business  and  what  the  long  term  implications  might  be.    This  lack  of   - 20 - 
knowledge  is  reflected  in  the  diversity  of  bid  prices  received  and  the  difference 
between these bid prices and the breakeven price of carbon calculated in the desktop 
studies.  This risk premium is largely influenced by uncertainty over rules for carbon 
trading and the concern that rules may change after contracts are signed.   
This analysis assumed that graziers would not be required to account for emissions 
from livestock or routine clearing.  However, if they were required to account for 
these emissions, most graziers would be net emitters and therefore worse off under an 
ETS.    Under  these  conditions  it  is  expected  that  regrowth  clearing  in  central 
Queensland would largely cease, woodlands  would thicken and livestock numbers 
would  decrease  as  graziers  adjust  stocking  rates  to  match  declining  carrying 
capacities. 
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Appendix A 
Bid Card Number 1 – Brigalow High Density 
 
 
Tree basal area: 8m
2haCurrent stocking rate: 1AE: 8ha (20ac) 
Paddock size: 500ha (total property area: 5,000ha) 
Pasture: buffel 
Water points: 1 trough 
Fences: Good condition 
Location: NOT in a priority area 
Answer the following questions. 
What  action  you would normally take in  a paddock of this  condition  to  continue 
grazing? (e.g. blade-plough now, blade-plough in five years, no action) 
How many hectares of this paddock would you include in the CSC? 
How much would you wish to be paid to enter into a Carbon Sequestration Contract 
(CSC)? (under the stated rules) $        /yr 
How likely is it that you would participate given the stated rules of a CSC? (ie 100% - 
would definitely participate, 0% definitely would not participate)    % 
The stocking rate you would expect after 20 years (if under a CSC):   - 25 - 
Bid Card Number 2 – Brigalow Low Density 
 
Tree basal area: 3m
2ha 
Current stocking rate: 1AE: 4ha (10ac) 
Paddock size: 500ha (total property area: 5,000ha) 
Pasture: buffel 
Water points: 1 trough 
Fences: Good condition 
Location: NOT in a priority area 
Answer the following questions. 
What  action  you would normally take in  a paddock of this  condition  to  continue 
grazing? (e.g. blade-plough now, blade-plough in five years, no action) 
How many hectares of this paddock would you include in the CSC? 
How much would you wish to be paid to enter into a Carbon Sequestration Contract 
(CSC)? (under the stated rules) $        /yr 
How likely is it that you would participate given the stated rules of a CSC? (ie 100% - 
would definitely participate, 0% definitely would not participate) 
        % 
The stocking rate you would expect after 20 years (if under a CSC): 
        Ha/head  - 26 - 
Bid Card Number 3 –Silver-leaf Ironbark High Density 
 
Tree basal area: 5.3m
2ha 
Current stocking rate: 1AE: 8ha (20ac) 
Paddock size: 500ha (total property area: 5,000ha) 
Water points: 1 trough 
Fences: Good condition 
Location: NOT in a priority area 
Pasture: buffel 
Answer the following questions. 
 
What  action  you would normally take in  a paddock of this  condition  to  continue 
grazing? (e.g. blade-plough now, blade-plough in five years, no action) 
How many hectares of this paddock would you include in the CSC? 
How much would you wish to be paid to enter into a Carbon Sequestration Contract 
(CSC)? (under the stated rules) 
$        /yr 
How likely is it that you would participate given the stated rules of a CSC? (ie 100% - 
would definitely participate, 0% definitely would not participate) 
        % 
The stocking rate you would expect after 20 years (if under a CSC): 
        Ha/head   - 27 - 




Tree basal area: 2.7m
2ha 
Current stocking rate:  
1AE: 8ha (20ac) 
Paddock size: 500ha (total property area: 5,000ha) 
Water points: 1 trough 
Fences: Good condition 
Location: NOT in a priority area 
Answer the following questions. 
What  action  you would normally take in  a paddock of this  condition  to  continue 
grazing? (e.g. blade-plough now, blade-plough in five years, no action) 
How many hectares of this paddock would you include in the CSC? 
How much would you wish to be paid to enter into a Carbon Sequestration Contract 
(CSC)? (under the stated rules) $        /yr 
How likely is it that you would participate given the stated rules of a CSC? (ie 100% - 
would definitely participate, 0% definitely would not participate) 
        % 
The stocking rate you would expect after 20 years (if under a CSC):   - 28 - 
Auction 2 – Individual Bid Card 
 
Nominate an area on your property, or a property you are familiar with, which you 
think would be suitable for a Carbon Sequestration Contract. (At least 50 hectares) 
Describe the area – it should be a paddock which has the potential for regrowth to 
occur 
Area/Paddock size      ha 
Vegetation  Brigalow                % 
  Ironbark                 % 
                                  
                                  
Last regrowth control                                                    Pulled       Year 
  Blade-ploughed      Year 
  Graslan (or similar)              Year 
      Year 
Soil type        % 
                                % 
                                % 
                                % 
Pasture  Buffel                    % 
  Speargrass             % 
                                % 
                                % 
Condition   A                           % 
  B                           % 
  C                          % 
  D                          % 
 
Current enterprise (e.g. steers, breeders) 
Current stocking rate 
Expected future stocking rate under a CSC 
 
How much would you wish to be paid for this Carbon Sequestration Contract?  
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How likely is that you would participate given the stated rules of a CSC (100% - 
would definitely participate, 0% definitely would not participate) 
 
        % 
How much would your bid and likelihood of participation change if the following 
rules were implemented? 
 
(Assume all other rules remain the same, each possible rule change is independent) 
 
 





Example  double  20% 
Yearly report 5 pages     
 
Yearly independent audit required     
 
 
Payments  made  every  five  years  at  completion  of 
independent audit 
   
 
Landholders can only sell additional carbon after on-
farm methane emissions accounted for.  
   
 
Contract length is 50 years     
 
Please list any other comments you have regarding the potential design of a carbon 
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Appendix B  
 
 
Mock Auction Carbon Sequestration Rules 
 
Policy terms 
- Landholders are not required to account for on-farm emissions, but may sell carbon 
sequestered on their land. 
Under  the  terms  of  the  Carbon  Sequestration  Contract  the  following  management 
actions would be prohibited: 
-  mechanical clearing e.g. blade-ploughing, pulling, thinning 
-  chemical clearing e.g. Graslan etc 
-  stocking rates above current levels 
Landholders would also be required to: 
-  implement a fire prevention plan (including firebreaks, control burning etc) 
-  implement a  weed and pest control plan 
-  maintain land condition at or above current condition (ABCD framework) 
-  submit  an  annual  1-page  report  on  progress/condition  of  sequestered  land 
(including photo standard) 
Contract terms: 
-  Carbon sequestration contracts will last for 20 years 
-  At the end of the 20 years the option will be available to renew the contract 
-  If property is sold the purchaser has the option to continue the contract.  If the 
contract is terminated, the purchaser is responsible for any emissions released 
as a result of a change in management.  
Payment schedule: 
-  Payments will be made annually at the completion of progress/condition report 
-  Independent audits will be carried out every five (5) years to ensure contract 
conditions are met.   
 